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Abstract 
This  study  compares  the  effectiveness of five  crop  insurance/disaster 
assistance plans:  an  individual  farm  yield insurance plan similar to  the 
current  FCIC  multi-peril program;  two  area yield insurance plans;  a  farm yield 
disaster assistance plan;  and  an  area yield disaster assistance plan.  These 
methods  are  examined  for  reduction in yield and  gross  income  variability with 
and without participation in the  government  deficiency payment  programs  using 
farm-level  yield data  from  98  dryland wheat  farms  and  38  dryland  corn  farms  in 
Kansas .  Although  individual  farm  yield insurance  is  complex,  suffers  from 
moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection problems,  and  is likely to be  the  most 
expensive  to  administer,  it provides  more  yield and  gross  income  risk 
reduction than  any  of  the  alternative  insurance/disaster assistance plans. 
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Therefore  the general  condition  in respect  to  the all-risk type of 
crop  insurance is that it will work  in a  satisfactory manner only 
under  a  system of conditions  so  exacting in  their specification  that 
they will  be  found  to rather limited extent  in American Agriculture. 
Harold  G.  Halcrow 
JFE,  August,  1949 
Halcrow  ~roposes an alternative  to all-risk crop  insurance which  is based 
on  an  expected area yield and  deviations  from  that yield rather  than  the 
expected  farm yield and  deviations  therefrom.  In his plan,  the  premiums  and 
indemnities  are based  on yields  received in an area  of uniform  crop production. 
Indemnities  are  paid  in bushels  to  any  insured producer  in those years  in which 
the  area  average yield falls  below  the  guaranteed area yield level  (the histor-
ical  mean  of  the  area  average  yield or  a  percentage  thereof).  All partici-
pating farmers  receive  the  same  per-acre  indemnity  and  pay  the  same  premium 
rate based  on  the historical area yield data.  For  example,  if the historical 
area  average yield for  wheat  is  32  bu/acre  and  the  area average  yield in the 
current year  is  24  bu/acre,  then each  insured producer  receives  an  indemnity 
payment  of  8  bushels  for  each  insured,  planted acre  of wheat  (assuming  a  0% 
deductible)  regardless  of their  own  produced yield. 
To  date,  little analysis has  been performed  to  determine  the  effective-
ness  of  an area-yield measurement  plan.  Miranda  recently completed  a  prelim-
inary analysis of Halcrow's  alternative using  farm  level data for  102  Western 
Kentucky  soybean  farms.  By  comparing  the  reduction  in the variance  of insured 
and uninsured yield distributions,  without  crop  prices  or  deficiency payments, 
he  concludes  that an  area yield measurement  is  capable  of providing effective 
yield-loss  coverage. 
The  objective of this  study  is  to  compare  the  effectiveness of the  indivi-
dual  yield insurance plan in the  current Federal  Crop  Insurance  Corporation 
(FCIC)  program with  the  area-yield methods  proposed by  Halcrow,  Barnaby  (1989, 2 
1990),  Barnaby  and  Skees  (1990),  and Miranda,  as  well  as  with  two  disaster 
assistance plans.  These  plans  are  examined  for  reduction in yield and  gross 
income  variability using  farm-level  yield data  from  98  dryland wheat  farms  in 
southcentral Kansas  and  38  dryland  corn  farms  in northeast Kansas.  Yield  and 
gross  income  distributions  are  estimated for  each  farm with  and without  govern-
ment  deficiency payments. 
BACKGROUND  AND  JUSTIFICATION 
The  Federal  Crop  Insurance  Act  of 1980,  P.L.  96-365,  expanded  the  availa-
bility of multiple peril  (all risk)  crop  insurance with  the  goal  of replacing 
the  USDA's  low-yield disaster assistance program.  The  direct payment  disaster 
assistance  programs  have  been criticized for  being expensive  (averaging  $436 
million per year between  1974  and  1980)  and  encouraging production in areas 
susceptible  to natural disasters  (GAO).  Although  the  1980  act  expanded  the 
scope  of crop  insurance  and  made  it more  widely available,  Congress  has  con-
tinued  to  provide  disaster assistance  payments  to  farmers  with  the  use  of emer-
gency  loans  and  direct payments,  most  recently  in the  drought  years  of.1988  and 
1989.  One  of  the  reasons  that disaster assistance has  been provided  is that 
sales  of crop  insurance have  remained relatively  low.  Although  enrollment  is 
increasing,  the  amount  of eligible acres  enrolled  in 1988  was  24.5%,  well below 
the  50%  participation goal  established for  the  program  in 1980  (GAO).  Even 
with  the  increase  in current participation rates  to  about  46%,  largely attri-
butable  to  recent crop  disasters  a?d  requirements  of crop  insurance participa-
tion for  some  producers  in 1989  under  the  Disaster Assistance Act  of 1988,  the 
most  ardent  supporters  of crop  insurance will not  dispute  that  the  multi-peril 
program has  not worked  as  well  as  expected. 
Adverse  selection and  moral  hazard are  significant problems  with  the 
current  crop  insurance  program,  in addition to  competition  from  other govern-
ment  programs  that provide  substitute  income variability reduction such  as 3 
disaster assistance,  FmHA  emergency  loans,  and  the  deficiency payment  program. 
Adverse  selection occurs  when  farmers  with higher relative yield risk can buy 
insurance at the  same  cost as  farmers  who  have  lower  relative yield risk when 
yield guarantees  are based  on  the  expected  individual  farm yield  (Skees  and 
Reed).  If farmers  recognize  this,  over  time  the  insurance  program will attract 
a  larger group with relatively high yield risks,  thereby  causing  insurance 
rates  to  increase  and  compounding  the  adverse  selection problem. 1  Under  the 
pretense of increasing participation,  this  could create  a  situation in which 
indemnity payments  increase  relative  to  premiums  if rates are not  increased. 
In fact,  indemnities  paid to  farmers  in the  1980-1988  period exceeded  the 
premiums  collected  (GAO).  Moral  hazard occurs  when  the  farmer  has  incentive  to 
alter production or harvest practices  to  increase  the  chance  of collecting crop 
insurance.  This  can happen when  indemnity  payments  are based  on  farm-specific 
measured  losses  and  the  market price is less  than  the  price  election used  to 
calculate  the  indemnity  payment  for yield losses. 
Under  the  area-yield or  "area-hedge"  approaches  suggested by  Halcrow  and 
Barnaby,  the  adverse  selection and  moral  hazard  inherent  in the  current  crop 
insurance  program  are  greatly reduced. 2  In  the  current  FeIe  program,  insurance 
premiums  are based  on  the  insured pool  of  farmers.  The  pool has  tended,  over 
time,  to have  more  farmers  who  have  higher yield variability and  fewer  farmers 
with  lower yield variability causing  insurance  rates  to  increase,  exacerbating 
further  the  adverse  selection problem.  By  contrast,  the  area plan pays  each 
producer  a  uniform  average  area yield loss with  no  individual  loss  adjustment; 
the  area yield loss measurement  includes  both  insured and  uninsured  farmers, 
1  Skees  and  Reed  conclude  that  the  current program  leads  to  adverse 
selection because  farmers  with relatively high  expected yields  can expect 
small  and  infrequent  indemnity payments  when  insurance  guarantees  are based  on 
expected  farm yield. 
2  The term "area-hedge" more appropriately describes this type of insurance 
to  the  industry because  of its past experience with  the  FeIe  area plan. 4 
thus  reducing  adverse  selection.  The  probability of collecting an  indemnity  is 
the  same  for all  insured  farmers  in  the  area,  although  the  "effective"  cost  and 
coverage vary.  Moral  hazard is prevented because  an  individual  farmer  cannot 
influence  the  indemnity by  altering production and/or harvest practices.  In 
addition,  accurate  farm  level yield data,  which historically have  been diffi-
cult to  obtain,  are not needed  to actuarially determine  insurance  premiums. 
During  discussion of  the  1990  Farm  Bill,  several  substitute/supplementary 
crop  disaster assistance proposals have  been put  forth.  In general,  they 
differ only  in the  ways  in which  a  disaster would  be  defined and  the  disaster 
payments  would be  calculated  -- either at  the  individual  farm  level or  the 
county  level  (area level) .  A  farm-level  disaster assistance  program has  been 
proposed by  U.S.  House  Representative  English  (Democrat,  Oklahoma).3  An  area-
level disaster assistance  program has  been proposed by  the  Bush Administration 
(USDA) .4  Both  of  these  plans  are  significantly different  from  current public 
policy:  they  establish  a  standing crop  disaster assistance  program  that would 
likely reduce political pressure  for  ad hoc  disaster assistance legislation 
such  as  that  experienced during 1988  and  1989.  However,  they both would  likely 
suffer  from  high administrative  costs,  because  disaster payments  are  based on 
farm-level  yields.  The  Administration Plan  faces  an  obstacle because  those 
farms  that have  yields higher  than  the  county  average  would  not benefit to  the 
same  relative degree  as  those  farms  that have  average yields  lower  than  the 
3  In the  English proposal,  the  FCIC  insurance  program  is continued.  A 
disaster is defined  on  a  farm-level  basis with assistance payments  based on  a 
percentage  of either the  ASCS  program yield or  the  proven  farm yield for  pro-
gram  crops  or  the  expected area yield for  non-program  crops. 
4  In  the Administration proposal,  the  FCIC  insurance  program  is discon-
tinued.  Disaster payments  are  available  to  crop  producers  in counties  where 
the  county  average yield is  less  that  65%  of  the  expected county average yield 
based  on  NASS  data.  Disaster payments  are based  on  the  difference between  60% 
of the  expected county  average yield and  the  actual  farm yield  (limited to 
$100,000). 5 
county  average. 5  Such provisions  of the proposal  would  encourage  production on 
less productive  lands.  Both proposals  would  suffer  from  adverse  selection, 
though  to different degrees .  The  English  Plan allows  for  proven yields;  there-
fore,  those  farmers  who  could prove higher yields  would  do  so,  whereas  those 
with  lower yields would  accept  the  county  average yield.  The  Administration 
Plan would  allow regional  adverse  selection because  farmers  would  grow  crops  in 
marginal  areas  that would not be  planted if the disaster program were  not 
available.  Additionally,  moral  hazard would  occur  under both proposals,  also 
to  different degrees.  Under  the  English  Plan,  moral  hazard would arise if the 
price elections  are  above  the  market price  and/or  the  growing  season is poor; 
farmers  could reduce  production  inputs  and harvest efficiency with  expecta-
tions  of having  a  low yield and  receiving  a  disaster payment.  Under  the 
Administration Plan,  moral  hazard would  occur  only when it is clear that  the 
county  is  going  to  suffer  a  loss  and  farmers  do  not  report  some  of their pro-
duction;  reporting of  "true"  yields  would  also be  difficult to  enforce  through 
the  legal process . 
Little analysis has  been undertaken  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of any 
of  the  area  crop  insurance  or  the  disaster assistance  programs  as  they  compare 
to  the  current  FCIC  program.  Therefore,  insight can be  gained  into which,  if 
any,  of these  alternative  insurance/disaster program alternatives  is effective 
by  simple  examination of their ability to  reduce  yield and  income  risks  faced 
by  farmers. 
5  For  example,  assume  a  30  bushel  expected county  soybean yield and  a 
current county yield of 19  bushels;  this would  trigger the  county disaster 
designation.  Also  assume  that Farmer A's  expected yield is 40  bushels  and 
Farmer  B's  expected yield is  20  bushels.  Under  the Administration proposal ,  if 
both  farmers  A  and  B suffer a  50%  loss,  Farmer  A would not receive  any  disast er 
assistance payments,  whereas  Farmer  B would  receive  the  equivalent of an  8 
bushel  per acre disaster assistance  payment. 6 
PROCEDURES  AND  DATA 
The  first step  in evaluating the  crop  insurance/disaster assistance 
programs  is  to  compare  the yield variation in the uninsured yield distribution 
to  that  in the  insured yield distribution for  each  method by  farm.  The  second 
step is to  repeat  the  comparison using  gross  income  including  indemnity pay-
ments  less  premiums  with  and without  government  deficiency payments.  These 
comparisons  are  made  using distributions  derived  from  the  five  insurance/ 
disaster assistance methods  described below.  The  coefficients of variation 
(C.v. )  for  wheat  and  corn yields  and  gross  returns  are  calculated for  each  farm 
for  each  insurance/disaster assistance  method  and  compared  to  the yield and 
gross  returns  C.V.s  for  no  insurance. 6  Market  prices  for  southcentral  and 
northeastern Kansas  for  the  period 1973  to  1987  are  converted  to  1988  dollars 
using  the  USDA  index  of prices  received by  farmers.  Government  deficiency 
payments  are  calculated using  1988  government  program rules .  For  the  analysis , 
the  mean  area yields  and  annual  deviations  from  the  area averages  are  the 
weighted  average  NASS  county yields  from  planted acres  for  the  lS-year period. 
Additionally,  actuaria11y fair premiums  are  charged for all considered 
insurance  p1ans. 7 
Continuous historical yield data  for  98  southcentral Kansas  dryland wheat 
farms  and  38  northeast Kansas  dry1and  corn  farms  from  1973-1987  obtained  from 
the  Kansas  Farm  Management  Data  Bank  are  used. 8  Yield statistics are  reported 
6  Coefficient of variation statistics,  rather  than standard deviations, 
are  used  to measure  risk reduction because  the  mean  returns  and yields  under 
disaster aid programs  are different  from  those  under  actuarially fair  insurance 
programs.  Also,  scenarios  including deficiency payments  have  different mean 
returns  than those without  the  payments. 
7  Actuarially fair assumes  that total premiums  equal  total  indemnities 
for  the  actuarial period. 
8  The  average  farm-level  yields  exceed  the  average  county yields  likely 
because  of selection bias.  The  Farm  Management  Association  farms  tend to be 
larger  and  more  profitable than average. in Table  1.  For  the  southcentra1 wheat  farms,  mean  average  farm  yields  always 
exceeded  the  average  annual  county yields  except  in McPherson  County;  the 
average  C.V.s  for  farm-level yields  exceeded  those  of  the  annual  county yields 
in all counties.  For  the northeast  corn  farms,  mean  average  farm  yields 
exceeded  the  average  annual  county yields  in all counties;  the  average  C.V.s 
for  farm-level  yields were  lower  than  those  of annual  county yields  in 7  of  the 
11  counties. 
Individual  Farm  Yield Insurance 
Under  current  FCIC  procedures,  each  farm has  an  insurance yield based  on 
historical  farm-level  yields.  The  farm  is  reimbursed  for  any yield loss  below 
the  guaranteed yield  (the  insurance yield)  less  an adjustment  for  the  deduct-
ib1e  level  selected by  the  producer.  Under  this plan,  gross  returns  (net of 
the  insurance  premium)  per  acre  are  described as 














gross  returns  to  the  farm  enterprise  ($/acre); 
market  price  ($jbu); 
effective national  average  loan rate  ($jbu); 
actual  farm yield produced  on planted acres  (bu/acre); 
target price  ($jbu); 
expected national  average  price  ($jbu); 
program yield based  on  1980-1984  farm  yields  (bu/acre); 
the  actuaria11y fair  crop  insurance  premium  ($/acre); 
max(O,IP  •  [(~F •  LC)  - YF])  ;  indemnity payment  ($/a~re); 
indemnity price election  (the per bushel price at which  the yield is 
insured)  ($jbu); 
- historical  average  farm  yield  from  planted acres;  the  insurance yield 
(bu/acre);  and 
1  - % deductible;  LC  ~ 1  (percent). 
Area Yield  Insurance 
The  indemnity calculation described  in Equation  [2a]  is based on  an area 
yield average  and  negative  deviations  (losses)  from  the  area average  and  does 
not use  or require  farm  level  data  for  calculating the  indemnity payment. Equation  [2a)  would  replace  INDEM  in Equation  [1);  the  remainder  of Equation 
[1)  is unaffected. 
[2a]  INDEM  - max{O,IP  •  [(HYA •  LC)  - YA)}  , 
where 
HYA  - historical average  area yield;  the  insurance yield  (bu/acre);  and 
Y A  - actual  area average yield produced  on  planted acres  (bu/acre). 
8 
Halcrow  suggests  that  the  indemnity be  paid in bushels;  therefore,  when  a  gross 
income  measure  is not used  (a strict interpretation using yields  only),  IP  is 
removed  from  the  equation. 
Under  Barnaby's  area  percentage  method,  the  farmer  is  allowed  to  chose  the 
level of dollar liability as  well  as  the  deductible  level.  The  indemnity pay-
ment  calculation for  the  method  described by  Barnaby  is 
[2b]  INDEM  =  max{O,  $LIAB  •  [«HYA - YA)/HYA)  - (1  - LC»)}  , 
where 
$LIAB  the  dollar level  of liability purchased  ($/acre) . 
Equations  [2a)  and  [2b)  are  identical when  the  liability level,  denominated  in 
bushels,  is restricted to  equal  the historical area  average  yield  ($LIAB  - IP  • 
HYA).  For  simplicity,  we  carry this  restriction throughout  our  analysis. 
Optimal-Coverage  Area Yield Plan 
Although  area-yield insurance  may  offer  a  method  for  limiting adverse 
selection and moral hazard compared  to  individual  farm yield insurance,  farmers 
whose  yields  (YF)  are not highly correlated with  the  area yields  (YA)  may  find 
an  area yield plan  ineffective  in reducing  risk.  To  test the  relationship, 
Miranda  suggests  a  simple  analytical  model 
where 
fiF  PF·  [Var(YF)(Var(YA)];  estimated for  each  farm; 
PF  - the  coefficient of correlation between YF and YA;  and £F  - a  random error term. 
The  estimated  ~Fs have  a  central  tendency  toward  1  and  indicate whether  the 
farm has  yield deviations  identical  to  (~F - I),  larger  than  (~F >  1),  or 
smaller  than  (~F <  1)  the  area yield deviations.  Generally,  the higher  the  ~F' 
the  greater  the  chance  that an area yield measurement will be  risk-reducing for 
the  farm.  Full-coverage  (O%-deductible;  LC  - 1  in Equations  [2a]  and  [2b]) 
area yield insurance will be  risk-reducing for  the  farmer  only if ~F is  above  a 
critical  ~ value,  ~c.  Miranda presents  a  method  for  calculating  ~c as 
Var(I) 
[3b]  ~c 
where 
2eCov(YA,I) 
I  - max(O,(HYA  - YA)},  the  full-coverage  area yield plan  indemnity stated 
in bushels. 
Under  the  area yield  insurance  plan  (Equation  [2a]),  when  the  farmer  is  allowed 
to elect a  coverage  level,  LC,  in order  to  minimize his yield risk,  the 
calculation for  the  optimal  LC  is  derived by  Miranda  as 
[3c]  LC  =  ~F/2~c 
Under  this  scheme,  a  farmer  is  allowed  to  "overinsure"  his  crop  if he  exper-
iences  relatively higher yield variability compared  to  the  area;  conversely,  a 
farmer  with relatively lower yield variability compared  to  the  ~rea would  seek 
a  higher deductible  (lower  coverage)  level.  Incorporating  the  optimal  LC  into 
Barnaby's  method  (Equation  [2b])  results  in a  more  flexible  strategy,  whereby 
the  farmer  could  choose  not  only  the  level  of coverage  but also  the  dollar 
liability level. 9  A  summary  of  the  ~Fs,  ~cs,  and  optimal  coverage  levels  are 
presented in Table  2.  Brief examination of  the  minimum  ~Fs  in relation to  the 
9  A strict interpretation of Barnaby's  method  limits  LC  5  1  and  places  no 
restrictions  on  $LIAB.  It can easily be  shown  that electing the  optimal  $LIAB 
level is  identical  to electing the  optimal  LC  level. 10 
PeS  indicates  that we  should expect  a  full-coverage  area  insurance  plan to be 
yield risk-reducing for  89  to  93  of the  southcentral  farms  and  for all  38  of 
the  northeast  farms.  The  optimal  coverage  elections  range  from  ox  to  248%  for 
the  southcentral wheat  farms  and  from  101.6%  to  246 . 6%  for  the northeast corn 
farms. 
Farm Yield Disaster Assistance 
Farm yield disaster assistance differs  from  farm  yield insurance  in  two 
significant ways:  (1)  coverage  is provided only if the  farm  experiences  a 
yield disaster;  and  (2)  coverage  is provided at no  cost  to  the  farmer.  In the 
analysis,  a  farm  yield disaster is  defined as  a  farm  yield of less  than  65%  of 
the historical average  farm yield on planted acres.  Disaster assistance pay-
ments  are calculated as  the  difference between  65%  of  the historical  average 
farm  yield and  the  actual  farm  yield.  Gross  returns  under  the  farm yield 
disaster program  are  calculated as 
[4]  GRF  - [max(P,EL)  •  YF )  +  ([TP  - max(EP,EL»)  •  Yp)  +  DAP  , 
where 
DAP  ~ max{O,IP  •  [(65%  •  HYF )  - Y F»));  the  disaster payment  ($/acre). 
Area  Yield Disaster Assistance 
Area yield disaster assistance differs  from  area yield  insurance  in the 
same  manner  as  farm yield disaster assistance differs  from  farm yield insurance 
except  in  the  ways  in which  a  disaster is defined  and  the  disaster payments  are 
calculated.  In the  analysis,  an  area yield disaster is defined  as  an area 
yield of less  than  65%  of  the  NASS  weighted historical average  county yield on 
planted acres.  The  disaster assistance payments  are  then calculated as  the 
difference between  65%  of  the historical averpge  county yield and  the  actual county yield. 10  All  farms  within a  disaster-designated area  receive  the  same 
disaster assistance  payment 
[5]  DAP  - max(O,IP  •  [(65%  •  HYA)  - YA)]). 
The  disaster assistance  payment  calculation in Equation  [5]  replaces  that in 
Equation  [4];  the  rest of Equation  [4]  remains  unaltered. 
Initially,  the  reduction in yield variability offered by  the  five  crop 
insurance/disaster assistance  programs  represented in Equations  [1]. through 
[5],  ignoring crop prices  and  government  program  deficiency payments,  is 
examined. 11  In addition,  to  simplify  the  comparison,  we  assume  that  the  crop 
is  insured using  a  0%  deductible plan  (except  for  the  optimal  coverage  area 
yield insurance)  and  that  the  premiums  are actuarially fair.12  Further 
analysis  is presented that  compares  the  gross  income variability reduction 
under  the  crop  insurance/disaster assistance  programs  with  and without  govern-
ment  deficiency payments.  Indemnity  and  disaster assistance  payments  are  based 
on  a  price election  (IP)  equivalent  to  the  1988  target price.  Finally,  consid-
eration is given  to  the  total  indemnity  and disaster assistance liabilities 
under  the  various  programs  that would  be  paid  to  the  farms  studied. 
RESULTS 
The  variability reductions  in yield and  gross  income  distributions  under 
the  insurance  and  disaster assistance  programs  relative  to  thos~ without 
insurance  or disaster assistance  coverage,  as  measured by  the percent reduction 
in the  coefficients of variation,  are presented in Tables  3  and  4.  The 
10  This  disaster assistance plan is equivalent  to  the  area  insurance 
described  in Equation  [2a]  with  a  35%  deductible  (LC  - 65%)  and provided at no 
cost  to  the  farmer  (CIP  =  0). 
11  In effect,  this  is equivalent  to  fixing  the value  of each bushel  pro-
duced  and  reimbursed  and  charging  a  crop  insurance  premium  in bushels  rather 
than dollars. 
12  By  using actuarially fair premiums,  the  means  of the yield and  gross 
income  distributions  are not  influenced by  the  insurance  method. 12 
individual  farm yield insurance  plan  (lY)  is  the  most  effective at reducing 
relative yield variability.  Relative variability in yields  is  reduced between 
27.5%  and  67.2%  for all wheat  farms  and between  36.1%  and  63.8%  for all corn 
farms;  average  reductions  are  41 . 9%  and  48.7%,  respectively.  The  second  most 
effective plan at reducing yield variability is  the  optimal  coverage  area yield 
insurance plan  (3Y).  Relative yield variability is  reduced by  an  average  of 
17.2%  and  43.0%  for  the  wheat  and  corn farms,  respectively,  under  this  insur-
ance  plan.  As  anticipated earlier,  the  full-coverage  area yield insurance plan 
(2Y)  reduces  relative yield variability for  89  of the  southcentral wheat  farms 
and all of  the  northeast  corn  farms;  it is  the  least effective of  the  three 
insurance plans  at reducing  the  relative variabilities of  the  wheat  and  corn 
yields  on  the  studied  farms.  Of  the  two  disaster assistance plans,  the  farm 
yield disaster assistance plan  (4Y)  is most  effective  and  reduces  relative 
yield variability between  0 . 0%  and  31.5%  for  the  southcentral wheat  farms  and 
between  4.8%  and  38 . 3%  for  the  northeast  corn  farms,  with  average  relative 
variability reductions  of  3.9%  and  22.3%,  respectively.  During  the  IS-year 
period,  the  NASS  county yield estimates  for  the  southcentral wheat  farm 
counties never  fell below  65%  of  the  expected  county yields;  therefore,  no  area 
yield disaster  occurs  for  these  counties  under  an  area yield disaster assist-
ance  plan  (SY).  For  the northeast  corn counties,  there  are  eight years  in 
which  none  of  the  counties  experienced area yield disasters  (as  defined pre-
viously) ;  however,  under  this plan,  relative yield variability is  reduced for 
all the  corn  farms  between  3.3%  and  26.0%,  with  an  average  of  14. 8%  reduction 
per  farm.  Neither  of  the  disaster assistance plans  is  as  effective at reducing 
relative yield variability as  the  three  insurance plans.  All of the  insurance 
and disaster assistance programs  provide  a  greater reduction in yield varia-
bility,  on  average,  for  the  corn  farms  than  for  the  wheat  farms.  Relative yield variability is much  greater for  the  corn enterprises  than for  the wheat 
enterprises  (see  Table  1). 
13 
When  consideration is  given  to  the  effectiveness  of these  five  programs  in 
reducing  gross  income variability,  cursory  comparisons  indicate  that  the  reduc-
tions  in relative gross  income variabilities are  less  than  the  reductions  in 
their yield-measured counterparts;  this  is explained by  the  additional risk 
from  price variations.  Examination of gross  income  without  government  defi-
ciency payments  indicates  that the  individual  farm  yield insurance plan  (lGWO) 
provides  the highest  average  relative reduction in gross  income  variability 
(19.8%  and  47.1%  reductions  for  the  wheat  and  corn  farms,  respectively)  in 
comparison  to  the  alternative plans.  The  area yield insurance  plan  (2GWO) 
reduces  relative gross  income variability on  90  (92%)  of the  wheat  and  37  (97%) 
of the  corn  farms;  relative  gross  income variability is reduced by  an  average 
of 7.3%  and  24.4%  per  farm  for  the  wheat  and  the  corn  farms,  respectively.  The 
optimal  coverage  area yield  insurance plan  (3GWO)  is  only  slightly more  effec-
tive  in reducing  gross  income variability for  the  wheat  farms  than  the  full-
coverage  area yield insurance plan.  Since price  risk is not  taken  into  account 
in determining  the  optimal  insurance  coverage  level under  this plan,  it is  less 
effective at reducing  gross  income variability for  the  corn  farms  than  the 
full-coverage  area yield insurance.  The  farm  yield disaster assistance plan 
(4GWO)  reduces  relative  gross  income  variability by  an  average  of  2.8%  and 
26.9%  for  the  southcentral wheat  farms  and  for  the northeast  corn  farms, 
respectively;  it is  the  second most  effective at  reducing relative variability 
in gross  income  for  the  corn  farms.  The  area yield disaster assistance plan 
(SGWO)  reduces  relative gross  income  variability for  the northeast  corn  farms 
between  2. 5%  and  26.5%;  it is  the  least effective at reducing  gross  income 
variability for  the  corn  farms. 14 
Gov  rnment  deficiency payments  reduce  gross  income  variability for  most  of 
th  f  rms ,  as  indicated by  the  average  relative  reductions  in gross  income  var-
i  bility ov  r  those  with  no  deficiency payments  (lGW)  of  35.2%  and  0.5%  for  the 
wh  t  nd  corn  farms ,  respectively.  Under all the  insurance/disaster assist-
It rnatives,  except  the  area yield disaster assistance plan  (4GW)  for  the 
st corn  farms,  the  reductions  in gross  income variability with defi-
c1  nc  p  ym  nts  included are  larger,  on  average,  than  the  reductions  in gross 
incom  v  ri b11ity with deficiency  payments  excluded. 
Th  total  insurance  indemnity/disaster assistance liability outlays, 
d  as  th  sum  of all indemnities/assistance payments  to all farms  not 
11  wing  for administrative  costs,  occurring under  the  alternative plans  are 
n 
d  in T  1  S.  As  anticipated,  the  alternative that would result in the 
er acre  for both  farming  regions,  is  the  area yield disaster 
the  farm  ield disaster assistance plan is slightly more 
If th  le el of insurance  coverage  is restricted to  100%  of the 
r  r  a  ield  the largest liability occurs  under  the  individual 
n,  If farmers  are  allowed  to  "overinsure, "  then  the  optimal 
plan r  sults in the largest outlay for  corn enterprises but 
ld  an is st'll the  most  expensive  for  wheat  enter-
i  li ~el  due  to higher  ariabilit  in yields experienced 
CO  SIDERATIO  S 
i  sura  e  plan is complex  it pro  ides 
an  gr ss  co  e  variab'l'  than an  of the 
pas.  The  go  ernment defi-
f  re ief from  gross  income 
s .  i  a  ents  ross 
an is  ine 15 
with  the  government  deficiency payment  program,  relative  gross  income  varia-
bility ts reduced more  than by  any  of the  programs  alone  for  nearly all of the 
sampled farms.  This  poses  two  policy considerations: 
(1)  an  adjustment in the  deficiency payment  program may  be  as  effective 
in reducing  gross  income variability as  any  crop  insurance  or 
disaster assistance  program;  and 
(2)  implementation of  a  crop  insurance  or disaster assistance program 
and elimination of the  deficiency payment  program may  be  more 
effective  than  the  existing deficiency payment  program. 
Implementation of these  crop  insurance  and disaster assistance plans 
requires  further  research consideration.  The  area  "yield hedge"  insurance 
plans  could be  based  on  percentage measures  and  dollars  of liability,  as 
Barnaby proposes,  rather  than bushels  of liability,  as  originally proposed by 
Halcrow.  This  would  eliminate  the  need  for  price forecasting  to  determine 
premiums,  an  issue  that FeIe presently faces,  and would  allow for  implementa-
tion procedures  similar  to  those  for private hail  insurance  with which  the 
insurance  industry is already  acquainted.  Each  farmer  would  have  to  determine 
the  optimal  amount  of liability and  deductible  level  to  purchase,  thereby 
eliminating the  need  for  the  insurer  to maintain farm-level  records . 
Additional  analysis  should consider  these  insurance  and disaster assist-
ance  methods  using  a  broader  scope.  Important  issues  to  consider  in future 
analyses  include  the  ease  of  implementation for  farmers  as  well as  for  FeIe  or 
other  insurance  institutions,  administrative costs,  and  cost effectiveness  of 
insurance plans  in comparison  to direct disaster assistance programs. 
, 16 
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Southcentral 
18.63  30 .06 
22.94  37.52 
22.67  35.93 
23.14  36.63 
21.48  38.86 
20.16  36.85 
21.35  35.46 
25.76  39.67 
20.97  37.20 
24.36  37.03 
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C  Arithmetic  mean  of  the  average  yields  from  planted acres  for  Kansas  Farm  Management  Association 
member  farms  within the  county  for  which  continuous  time-series  data were  available. 
...... 
-..J Table  2.  Summary  of fiF  and  fie  Estimates  and  Optimal  Coverage  Levels  (LC)  Under  an Area  Insurance  Plan,  by 
County 
Frequency of fiF  Estimates 
Optimal  LC 
0.26  0.51  0.76  l.01  l.  26  Level  (%) 
No .  of  ~  to  to  to  to  to  ~  Min.  Max. 
County  Farms  0.25  0.50  0 .75  l.  00  l.  25  l.  50  l.  51  fiF  fiF  fie  Min.  Max. 
Southcentral  Kansas  Dryland Wheat 
Barton  11  2  4  4  1  0.602  l.  279  0.341  88.3  187.5 
Harper  9  3  1  3  1  1  0.299  l.  290  0.260  57.5  248.1 
Harvey  9  2  2  2  2  1  0.624  1.646  0.350  89 .1  235.1 
Kingman  2  1  ··1  0.383  l.  099  0.332  57.7  165 .5 
McPherson  7  2  3  1  1  -0.027  1.642  0.333  0.0  246.5 
Pratt  3  I  •  1  1  1  0.606  l.019  0.305  99.3  167.0 
Reno  11  1  1  2  3  3  1  0.098  l.613  0.331  14.8  243.7 
Rice  14  2  4  4  3  1  0.569  l.  520  0.333  85.4  228.2 
Sedgwick  13  2  3  5  2  1  0.230  l.  303  0.347  33.1  187.8 
Stafford  6  2  2  2  0.918  l.492  0.300  153 .0  248.7 
Sumner  13  1  4  5  3  0.359  l.141  0.351  5l.1  162.5 
Cumulative  98  5  9  14  29  26  11  4 
Northeast  Kansas  Dryland  Corn 
Atchison  3  1  1  1  0.643  l.  274  0.268  120.0  237.7 
Brown  9  1  5  2  1  0.640  l.  303  0.315  101.6  206.8 
Doniphan  3  1  1  1  0.733  1.307  0.265  138.3  246 .6 
Douglas  3  1  2  0.708  0.978  0.319  111.0  153.3 
Jackson  2  1  1  l.  235  l.477  0.307  201.1  240 .6 
Jefferson  1  1  l.  029  l.029  0.309  166.5  166.5 
Leavenworth  11  2  2  6  1  0.946  l.  532  0.326  145.1  235.0 
Pottawatomie  1  1  0.891  0.891  0.272  163 .8  163.8 
Shawnee  3  3  0.933  0.997  0.341  136.8  146.2 
Wabaunsee  1  1  1.206  1. 206  0.305  199.7  199.7 
Wyandotte  1  1  1.049  1.049  0.294  178.4  178.4 
Cumulative  38  4  15  8  10  1  I-' 
(Xl Table  J.  Frequency  of Relative Reduction  In  Yield  and  Gross  Income  Varlabilitya  for  98  Southcentral Kansas  Farm Manas.ment Association Dryland  Wheet 
Farms,  by  Crop  Insurance/Disaster Assistance  Plan,  197J  to  1987 
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SGWc 
a  The  reduction  in  relative variability is measured  as  the  percent  chanse  In  the coefficient of variation between  the  insurance,  disaster 
assistance,  or deficiency payment  scenario  and  no  Insurance.  no  disaster sssistance.  nor deficiency  payment  participation.  Under  the  crop  insurance 
plans,  the  reduction  in relative variability is  also  the  percent  chanse  in  the  standard deviation  between  the  insurance  plans  and  no  coverase  because 
of  the  use of actuarially fair  premiums. 
b  Stratesies:  lY  - Individual  Farm  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
2Y  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
3Y  Optimal Coverase  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
loY  - Farm  Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trisser)  versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
5Y  - Area  Yield Disaster Assistance  (351  Loss  Trlsser)  Versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
1~  - Individual  Fa~ Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance.  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
2~  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
3~  Optimal Coverase  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance.  No  Deficiency  Payments  (GroBs  Income) 
4GWO  Farm  Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss Trisser) versus  No  Insurance.  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
5GWO  Area  Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trlsser)  versus  No  Insurance.  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
OGW  Deficiency  Payments  versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
IGW  Individual Farm  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance.  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
2GW  Area Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
3GW  Optimal Cove rase Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance.  With  Deficiency  Paymants  (Gross  Income) 
4GW  Farm  Yield Dlaaster Assistance  (J51  Loss  Trlsser)  versus  No  Insurance.  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
5GW  - Area  Yield Disaster Assistance  (J51  Loss  Trlsser)  versus  No  Insurance.  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) . 
c  Durins  the  1~ year  period.  none  of  the  count ies  experienced  a  disaster.  A disaster  Is  defined herein  as  the  annual  county yield droppins 
below  651  of  the  hist orical weishted  county  ave rase  yield . 
.... 
\C 
------------------------------------------------~===. ~ Table  4.  Frequency of Relative Reduction  in Yield  and  Gross  Income  Variabilitya for  38  Northeast Kansas  Farm  Manasement Association Dryland Corn 
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a  The  reduction  in relative variability is measured  as  the  percent  change  in the  coefficient of variation between  the  insurance,  disaster 
assistance,  or deficiency  payment  scenario  and  no  insurance,  no  disaster assistance,  nor  deficiency payment  participation.  Under  the  crop  insurance 
plens,  the  reduction  in relative variability is  also the percent  change  in  the  standard deviation between  the  insurance plans  and  no  coverage because 
of the  use  of actuarially fair premiums. 
b  Strategies:  lY  - Individual Farm  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
2Y  - Area Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
3Y  - Optimal Coverage  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
4Y  - Farm Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trigger)  versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
5Y  - Area Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trigger)  versus  No  Insurance  (Yield) 
1GWO  - Individual Farm  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
2GWO  - Area Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
3GWO  - Optimal Coverage  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
4GWO  - Farm Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trigger)  versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
5GWO  - Area  Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trigser)  versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
OGW  Deficiancy Payments  versus  No  Insurance,  No  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
1GW  - Individual Farm  Yield  Inaurance versus  No  Insurance,  With  Deficiency Payments  (Gross  Income) 
2GW  - Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
3GW  - Optimal Coverage  Area  Yield  Insurance versus  No  Insurance,  With  DefiCiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
4GW  - Farm Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Loss  Trigger)  versus  No  Insurance,  With  Deficiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) 
5GW  - Area Yield Disaster Assistsnce  (35%  Loss  Trigger)  versus  No  Insurance,  With  DefiCiency  Payments  (Gross  Income) .  I'V 
o Table  5.  Total Insurance  Indemnity/Disaster Assistance Liabilities  Under  5  Crop  Insurance/Disaster Assistance Plans,  Southcentral Kansas  Dryland 
Wheat  Farms  and  Northeast Kansas  Dryland Corn  Farms.  by  Year  and  County,  1973  to  1987 
























































Southcentral Kansas  Wheat  Farms 
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Total  765, 019  8,696,032  5,837,418  8,322,374  418.128  a 
Avg .  Per  Acre 
a  Strategies: 
11 .37  7.63  10 .88 
1  - Individual Farm  Yield  Insurance 
2  Area Yield  Insurance 
0. 55 
3  Optimal Coverage  Area  Yield  Insurance 
0.00 
4  Farm  Yield Disaster Assistance  (35%  Farm  Loss  Trigger) 


































234 , 777 



































































































































121, 567  5,050,028  3,970,427  6,912,533  1, 547 ,004  1,114,020 
41 . 54  32 .66  56.86  12.73  9.16 
r--.:: 
~ 